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I. REFRESHING THE MEMORY
A. Independent Recollection Required
Notes, memoranda, or other documents may be used by a witness
to refresh his memory.' The memoranda are to be used merely to stimulate
the witness' memory, and his testimony must be based only on indepen-
dent recollection.2
The court in United Sand & Material Corp. v. Florida Industrial
Commission' held that it was error not to allow the court reporter to
* The decisions surveyed in this article have been reported in volumes 201 through 224
of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
** Former Assistant Digest Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow, 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704 (1903). Original notes or
memoranda made contemporaneously with or soon after a transaction or event may be used
as the basis of testimony given at a later time by the person who made the notes or
memoranda. Such testimony is admissible as a past recollection recorded and is an exception
to the hearsay rule. Only then is independent recollection not required.
2. Id.
3. 201 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1967).
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testify at the workmen's compensation proceeding from her own shorthand
notes made at an interview between the claimant and an adjuster.'
Testimony made merely from memoranda with no independent re-
collection is not permitted. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company
v. Nobles,5 the plaintiff in an overtime compensation action testified from
a memorandum pertaining to overtime hours. He admitted that he could
not testify to the overtime hours during each of the claimed weeks with-
out looking at his memorandum, which had been made subsequent to
the overtime. The court held that it was error to permit such testimony
because the memorandum was not to be used for the purpose of stimulating
the plaintiff's memory but only as a basis of his testimony pertaining to
overtime worked. Since he had no independent recollection of the over-
time,' he could not use the memorandum.
B. Examining The Memoranda
The trial court in Kimbrough v. State' refused to permit the defen-
dant to inspect a written report used to refresh a police officer's memory
before testifying. The court of appeal affirming the trial court, held that
when a witness refreshes his memory by the use of memoranda out of
court, he is not obliged to produce it to allow the opposing party to in-
spect the memoranda.
II. OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Competency of Experts
It is generally recognized that experts need not have personal ex-
perience to qualify as competent expert witnesses. "[T]o give an opinion
on a medical question, one may be qualified by study without practice,
or by practice without study. . . . "' In Hawkins v. Schofman,9 a mal-
practice action, a neurologist was not permitted to testify as an expert
witness to show the approved medical standards for the operation in ques-
tion. The trial court held that the expert was not qualified because he
had no personal experience in performing such an operation. The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court, holding that the neu-
rologist should have been permitted to testify because he had medical
4. It is unclear whether the court permitted the court reporter's testimony into evidence
because she merely refreshed her memory from her shorthand notes or because such testimony
was based on the notes and, therefore, admissible as a past recollection recorded and as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
5. 202 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
6. The court further stated that the memo was not made at or about the time of the
happening of the overtime (memo of overtime work was made from old calendars long after
overtime was worked) ; therefore, it was not a past recollection recorded, and such testimony
was hearsay.
7. 219 So.2d 122 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1969).
8. Copeland v. State, 58 Fla. 26, 32, 50 So. 621, 624 (1909) (emphasis added).
9. 204 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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training and professional knowledge of the standards and procedure for
such an operation. The court stated that the lack of personal experience
in performing such an operation only goes to the weight of the testimony
and not to the competency of the witness.
A party having experience for a substantial number of years in var-
ious aspects of rail transportation of particular goods from Florida to
the Eastern United States was held to be competent to testify as an expert
concerning the usual and customary time required for the rail transpor-
tation of the goods in question. The expert was qualified by virtue of his
study of authoritative sources, although he had no practical experience
in actually transporting the goods by rail.' °
Once a clinical psychologist is qualified as an expert by reason of
his education and experience, he is competent to testify as to his diagnosis
of a person's mental condition based upon techniques ordinarily resorted
to by such practitioners." The dicta in Reese v. Naylor" indicates that
although clinical psychologists are competent to testify as to one's mental
condition, there might be a different ruling with regard to testifying as
to the cause of the mental condition. The latter, the court said, is a med-
ical question to be answered by medical doctors.
B. Expert Subject Matter
Once an expert is deemed competent to testify, it must be determined
whether the subject of inquiry is an expert subject matter. If understand-
ing the subject of inquiry requires special knowledge, skill, experience,
or training; it is considered expert subject matter.
In an action for damages as a result of negligence,"3 the fourth dis-
trict held that the following questions of inquiry to an expert witness were
not expert subject matter; and, therefore, no opinion could be expressed
thereon: (1) whether or not the driver of the car in qustion exhibited
sensible control of it; and (2) whether or not the probable cause of the
accident was the driver's going to sleep.' 4 The court stated that:
[e]xpert opinions are admissible only when the facts to be de-
termined are obscure and can be made clear only by the opinions
of persons skilled in relation to the subject matter of the in-
quiry; and when facts are within the ordinary experience of the
jury, conclusions therefrom will be left to them....11
C. Hypothetical Questions
It is generally recognized that a hypothetical question asked of an ex-
pert witness must be based on facts previously adduced in the evidence. 6
10. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Lake Region Packing Ass'n, 211 So.2d 25 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1968).
11. Reese v. Naylor, 222 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
12. Id.
13. Smaglick v. Jersey Ins. Co., 209 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 476.
16. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Morgan, 213 So.2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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Facts which are set forth in a hypothetical question must, as stated above,
be before the court; but direct proof of such facts is not required, and
circumstantial proof will suffice. 7
An action was brought against the insurer in Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Griffin' to recover death benefits allegedly due under an auto-
mobile policy providing for benefits if death was caused as a result of an
accident with the insured automobile. Decedent was a passenger in the
insured automobile. While in the hospital three weeks after the accident,
decedent sustained a cerebral thrombosis and approximately one year
thereafter she died. On trial, plaintiff's expert medical witness expressed
an opinion based on a hypothetical question, stating that there was a causal
connection between the automobile accident and the decedent's death.
The expert's opinion was based on the assumption that the cerebral throm-
bosis occurring prior to death was in the same general area of the brain
as the one occurring three weeks following the accident, although no direct
proof of this was established. The court held that the hypothetical ques-
tion was permissible because there was competent, substantial evidence
in the record tending to prove the facts in the hypothetical question, and
direct proof was not required.
D. Opinions Based on Unreliable Information
Opinions by expert witnesses must be based on reliable information.',
Opinion testimony based on hearsay statements is inadmissible because
the foundation of the expert's opinion is based on unreliable evidence."
The unreliable information rule was illustrated in Cirack v. State.2'
Testimony of a psychiatrist as to the defendant's voluntary intoxication,
thus establishing lack of premeditation in a first-degree murder case, was
held inadmissible. The doctor's opinion was based on self-serving decla-
rations made by the defendant and such facts were neither in evidence nor
within the doctor's knowledge and were, therefore, clearly unreliable.22
Courts make a distinction between treating and examining physicians
when determining the admissibility of a physician's opinion on the pa-
tient's condition which is based in whole or in part on the patient's history
as related to the physician by the patient.2 Thus, the court in Marshall v.
Papineau stated:
[T] he opinion of a physician or surgeon as to the condition of
an injured plaintiff, based wholly or in part on the history of the
case as told to him by the latter on a personal examination, is
inadmissible when the examination was made for the purpose of
17. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 222 So.2d 754 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
18. Id.
19. Cirack v. State, 201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967).
20. Smith v. Frisch's Big Boy, Inc., 208 So.2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
21. 201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967).
22. Accord, Martin v. State, 218 So.2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
23. Bondy v. West, 219 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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qualifying the physician or surgeon to testify as a medical wit-
ness.
24
The reason for the above rule is that when a physician is consulted for
the purpose of treating the patient, it is safe to assume that he will tell
the truth to the physician since he is interested primarily in being cured,
but when a doctor is consulted merely to testify the tendency is to the
contrary.
The "examining versus treating" concept relating to expert testimony
was further deliniated in Bondy v. West. 2 The court found that the de-
position of a physician as an expert witness was inadmissible because he
was an examining physician, and his opinion of the plaintiff's condition
was based in part on the history related to him by the plaintiff. The ex-




Under rule 1.450(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, a witness
who proves to be unwilling or hostile can be interrogated by leading ques-
tions but is not subject to impeachment as is a witness called by an ad-
verse party. Any right to impeach one's own witness is derived from Flor-
ida Statutes section 90.09, where although impeachment through evidence
of bad character is prohibited, if the witness proves adverse, a party can
impeach such an adverse witness through the use of prior inconsistent
statements.
Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Cutler26 interpreted "adverse" to mean
that the party producing the witness has been surprised or entrapped
by the statements made by such a witness. In the Foremost case, the
defendant called the plaintiff's son as a witness. He was questioned as to
whether or not he made a statement to the investigating officer to the
effect that the headlight on his brother's bicycle was not working at the
time of the accident. The witness answered in the negative, and the defen-
dant called the investigating officer to impeach the witness's testimony
through the use of a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness to
the officer. The court stated that the defendant knew what the witness
would testify to and such a witness was, therefore, not an adverse witness
as the defendants were neither surprised not entrapped by the witness's
testimony. A party can not put a witness on the stand knowing that his
testimony will be adverse and claim surprise in order to impeach him.27
24. 132 So.2d 786, 787 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
25. 219 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
26. 212 So.2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
27. Such strategy would allow a party to get evidence before the court which otherwise
would be inadmissible.
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B. Prior Inconsistent Statements
It is generally recognized that statements made out of court can be
introduced in court against a witness for the purpose of impeachment,
i.e., impeachment through the use of the out-of-court statement as a prior
inconsistent statement. Such statement does not come in for its truth and
is, therefore, not hearsay.2
In Wingate v. New Deal Cab Co.,2' a passenger in the defendant's
car stated to the plaintiff's attorney that she had no knowledge of the
plaintiff's speed at the time of the automobile accident. During the trial
she testified that the plaintiff was traveling at seventy-five miles per hour.
The court of appeal held it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit
into evidence the prior inconsistent statements of the defendant's witness.
Such inconsistency raises a doubt as to the veracity of the witness's tes-
timony.
Under Florida Statutes section 92.33 it is required by every person
taking a written statement of an injured person to furnish this person
with a true and complete copy of the statement. Failure to comply with
the statute prevents the use of the written statement as evidence in any
civil action. In United Sand & Material Corp. v. Florida Industrial Com-
mission,"0 the Florida Supreme Court held that the policy underlying the
statute, i.e., protecting injured persons against being disadvantaged by
statements taken from them, can not be utilized to prevent a party from
testing the truthfulness of a witness by impeachment through prior in-
consistent statements. The statements made by the injured claimant to
the employer's insurance adjuster were, therefore, admissible in the work-
men's compensation proceeding to impeach the claimant."'
IV. COMPETENCY
A. Confidential Communications
Although by statute the common-law principle which precludes one
spouse from testifying against another spouse in a judicial proceeding is
abrogated, 2 neither may disclose communications between them on the
grounds they are confidential or privileged.
This privilege was raised by the defendant in Ross v. State,5 where
the defendant gave his wife a sweater which was stolen. He argued that
the physical act of delivering the sweater to his wife was just as much a
28. C. McCoRAtCK, EVIDENCE § 226 (1954).
29. 217 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
30. 201 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1967).
31. Claimant had an interview with his employer's insurance adjuster where he stated
that his work activities were normal on the morning he suffered the heart attack. At the
hearing he stated he performed work not routine to his duties which involved strain and
exertion. Claimant tried to invoke Florida Statutes section 92.33 (1967) because he never
received a copy of the written statement given to the adjuster.
32. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.04, 932.31 (1967).
33. 202 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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communication to her as a statement that he stole the sweater; therefore,
his wife should not have been allowed to testify as to the receiving of the
sweater. The court concluded that the physical act of receiving the sweater
did not constitute a confidential communication under common law, and
his wife was competent to testify.
B. Waiver of Privilege
The privilege existing between husband and wife as to their communi-
cations is a personal privilege that may be waived. 4 When a party, with-
out objection, testifies to a confidential communication between his wife
and himself at an oral deposition prior to trial, he waives his right to in-
voke the privilege.8" In Tibado v. Brees,8 the court held that under rule
1.280(b) 37 the defendant did not have to answer any privileged matters.
Because he voluntarily answered these same matters at the oral deposition,
however, he waived the privilege and at trial could not object to the in-




Relevancy is generally defined as any evidence which tends to shed
light on the facts in issue or evidence having any tendency in reason to
prove any material fact. In Wolfe v. State,88 the defendant was convicted
of manslaughter. The prosecution's main witness testified that the defen-
dant told her he had "beat up Frank. '3 9 The witness was asked what her
relationship was with the deceased. She answered that he was her husband
over an objection by the defendant of irrelevancy. The court held that
such evidence was relevant because it helped the jury understand the
witness's testimony about the defendant's admission by showing that the
"Frank" in the statement made to the deceased's wife was the deceased.
Therefore, the witness's relationship to the deceased was clearly relevant.
B. Character of the Accused
In a criminal case, the prosecution presented testimony which dis-
paraged defendant's character. Defendant had not placed his character
34. Tibado v. Brees, 212 So.2d 61 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b): Scope of Examination. "Unless otherwise ordered by the
court as provided herein, the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not priv-
ileged. . . ." (emphasis added).
38. 202 So.2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
39. Id. at 134. Such statement, although hearsay, was admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule, an admission against an interest. See note 51 infra and accom-
panying text.
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in issue; and the testimony adduced did not shed any light on motive,
intent, or any relevant issues. The testimony was introduced solely for
the purpose of showing the bad character of the accused and was, there-
fore, irrelevant.40
In State v. Wadsworth,41 defendant was convicted of manslaughter
as an intoxicated motorist.2 Over objection, the prosecution introduced
into evidence testimony that the defendant bought liquor two or three
times per week, and while making these purchases told the store clerk
that he had a problem. The court of appeal held that the sole relevancy
of the above evidence was as an attack on the bad character of the ac-
cused; and it was, therefore, inadmissible.
The Supreme Court of Florida in reversing the above decision rea-
soned that evidence of the prior intemperate habits of a person is relevant
to, and may be given as corroborating evidence on, the question of whether
such person was intoxicated at any given time and place, when intoxica-
tion at such time and place is a material issue.43
C. Evidence of Other Offenses
The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that "relevant evidence
will not be excluded merely because it relates to facts which point to the
commission of a separate crime."44 In Jenkins v. State,45 a fingerprint card
of the defendant's was admitted into evidence for a comparison of other
fingerprint evidence taken at the scene of the crime. The fingerprint card
showed a prior criminal record, and the court held that the fingerprint
card was relevant. The fact that the card pointed to the commission of
other crimes did not cause it to be excluded.
As long as the introduction into evidence of other related crimes is
used to establish a common scheme, plan, motive, or intent, it is generally
held admissible as being relevant.46 The Florida Supreme Court in Haw-
kins v. State47 affirmed the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder.
The trial court admitted evidence of other related crimes. These crimes
were robberies committed within eight days, each one resulting in the
death of the filling station attendant on duty at the station robbed. Each
victim was killed from a shotgun blast administered in approximately
40. Fitzgerald v. State, 203 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). The defendant never ob-
jected to the testimony, and the error was not jurisdictional or fundamental error; there-
fore, testimony not objected to could not be raised on appeal.
41. 210 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1968), rev'g 201 So.2d 836 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
42. FLA. STAT. § 860.01 (1967) (statute prohibits driving while intoxicated).
43. State v. Wadsworth, 210 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1968), rev'g, 201 So.2d 836 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1967).
44. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 659 (Fla. 1959).
45. 208 So.2d 276 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); accord, White v. State, 218 So.2d 484 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969).
46. See Winkfield v. State, 209 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; Blackburn v. State, 208
So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
47. 206 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1968) ; accord, Schack v. State, 201 So.2d 580 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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the same area of the body. The supreme court held such evidence relevant
to the pattern, motive, and intent of the defendant.
A similar set of facts was presented in Avis v. State.4" Attendants of
service stations previously robbed testified that the defendants were the
parties who had previously robbed the stations. The court of appeal held
this testimony of prior related crimes (i.e., robbery) admissible "as sim-
ilar fact [elvidence tending to show pattern, motive and intent."49
VI. HEARSAY
A. Generally
In a suit requiring the defendants to move their boundary line, the
plaintiffs offered into evidence, over the defendant's objection, a plat show-
ing a proposed subdivision of the lot in question as evidence of where the
subdivision should have been. The witness introducing the plat admitted
he did not run the lines of the survey and was not present when they were
run. Therefore, the plat was not admissible as a business record (an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule). The appellate court held that such evidence
was hearsay and inadmissible into evidence. 0
B. Admission Against Interest
It is generally recognized that when a party makes an admission
against his interest, the out-of-court statement is admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule.51
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized the distinction be-
tween a criminal conviction and that of a criminal conviction based on
a plea of guilty, the latter being admissible into evidence in a civil suit
as an admission against interest.52
In the personal injury action of Chimerakis v. Evans,53 the plaintiff
sought to introduce into evidence the defendant's plea of guilty to a vio-
lation of the Metropolitan Dade County Traffic Code. The trial court
refused to allow the evidence to be admitted because it was hearsay. The
Supreme Court of Florida held such evidence admissible as an admission
against interest.
In a declaratory judgment action, the creditor sought to have his
judgment lien declared superior to the judgment debtor's claim of home-
stead exemption. The creditor introduced into evidence a statement made
by the judgment debtor at the time of attempted levy upon her property
as indicating doubt as to her ownership and, therefore, lack of homestead
48. 221 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
49. Id. at 239.
50. Williams v. Johntry, 214 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
51. C. McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE § 253 (1954).
52. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
53. 221 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1969).
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status. The court held the statement admissible as an admission against
interest.5
4
Statements made by an employee while acting within the scope of
his authority can be used in an action against the employer.5" This "ad-
mission against interest" exception was illuminated in Continental In-
surance Co. v. Levinson,"6 an action against an insurer for the sinking of
a vessel. The investigating insurance agent, authorized to represent the
insurance company regarding the claim, testified for the plaintiff. The
agent testified that during the investigatory stage he told the plaintiff
that in his opinion coverage for loss would lie under the contract. The
Third District Court of Appeal reasoned that while the insurance agent
was acting as investigator of the claim he was the employee of the
insurer, and his statements regarding coverage under the policy were
made within the scope of his employment. The court held that the state-
ments were admissible as admissions against interest by an authorized
agent of the insurer acting within the scope of his authority.
Evidence of a defendant's actions in resisting the taking of a chemi-
cal test5" for the presence of powder burns was suppressed at the trial
court level. In State v. Esperti,"8 the court of appeal, assuming the test
to be constitutional, reversed the trial court and held that such evidence
was clearly relevant as indicating a consciousness of guilt. Such conduct
was considered an admission by the defendant because the chemical
test was compulsory.5"
C. Business Records
In Florida, business records, insofar as they are relevant, are com-
petent evidence if the requirements of the statute are fulfilled.6" In
Smith v. Frisch's Big Boy, Inc.,61 the defendants had police officers run
a test to determine the speed of plaintiff's car. Officer A drove the car, and
officer B measured the skid marks. Officer B put the speed of the test
car on the police report relying on what officer A told him. Officer B testi-
fied on trial as to the speed of the test car, and on appeal the court held
the testimony was purely hearsay, as it was merely based on what officer
A had told him. The testimony could not come in as a business record
because the report was not made in the regular course of business.12 The
54. La Gasse v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
55. Continental Ins. Co. v. Levinson, 224 So.2d 445 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
56. Id.
57. The test was administered to see if defendant had recently fired a gun.
58. 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), discussed in Comment, Admissibility of Testi-
monial By-Products of a Physical Test, 24 MiMI L. REv. 50 (1969).
59. If the chemical test was not compulsory the evidence should be inadmissible, because
consciousness of guilt would not be the logical inference; see Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 370 (1963).
60. FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1967).
61. 208 So.2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
62. FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1967) (to be admissible, the record must have been made in the
regular course of business).
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court also held that the Uniform Business Records Act68 applies only to
the admissibility of business records themselves, not oral testimony per-
taining to the contents of such records.
The second district court in Holloman v. State64 held that the letters
of two psychiatrists from the Florida State Hospital introduced as evi-
dence of the defendant's insanity were inadmissible because the psy-
chiatrists were not called as witnesses, and the letters were hearsay. The
court further stated that the letters were not part of the hospital records
and, therefore, were not admissible as business records.
Under Florida Statutes section 92.36, business records are admissible
into evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness authenticates
the records. In Mastan Co. v. American Custom Homes, Inc.,65 the wit-
ness used to introduce the business records (ledger cards) was not the
official custodian of the records and did not post the entries into the
ledger cards. The court held that the ledger cards were inadmissible be-
cause the witness was not a qualified witness or custodian of the records
and the statutory requirements for authentication were not fulfilled. 6
D. Coconspiracy Rule
The requirements for admission of hearsay testimony under the
coconspiracy exception were layed out in Corba v. United States7 as
follows:
1) the declaration must be in furtherance of the conspiracy,
2) the declaration must be made during the pendency of the con-
spiracy,
3) there must be independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy
and of the connection of the defendant with the conspiracy.68
The coconspiracy rule was asserted in Farnell v. State9 where the
defendant, a school superintendent, was charged with embezzlement of
school materials. A second party was also charged but never brought to
trial. The trial court admitted into evidence instructions and statements
made by the second party to school workers regarding the taking of
school supplies and furniture for personal gain. The evidence was ad-
missible under the theory that a conspiracy existed, and the second party
charged was a coconspirator with the defendant. On appeal, the second
district held that before the exception can be invoked there must first
be independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy and of the
defendant's involvement in the conspiracy, i.e., the evidence sought to
be introduced is not sufficient by itself to establish the conspiracy and
the defendant's involvement. The court found that the alleged conspiracy
63. Id.
64. 213 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
65. 214 So.2d 103 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
66. FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1967).
67. 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
68. Id. at 735 n.21.
69. 214 So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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was not established by independent evidence, and the testimony was
inadmissible.
VII. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Courts will generally judicially notice facts of general or common
knowledge. This alleviates the necessity of proving the fact in question. 0
The Florida courts have taken judicial notice of official journals of
both the House and Senate of the Florida Legislature; 7' the record of
extradition proceedings on file in the Secretary of State's office relating
to a habeas corpus proceeding;72 and a transcript of record filed in a
previous direct appeal when reviewing a collateral attack proceeding. 8
Florida courts will not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances,
and they must be pleaded and proved.74 In Wilkens v. Tebbetts,75 a land-
lord brought an unlawful detainer action against the tenant. The tenant
defended on the ground that the landlord cannot evict a tenant merely
because the tenant notified the authorities regarding the landlord's inad-
equate electric system. The court held that although on appeal the tenant
argued that the landlord violated a municipal ordinance and mere notifi-
cation of this to the authorities was not grounds for eviction, no allegation
in the pleading was made regarding the violation. Since the court would
not judicially notice the municipal ordinance, the judgment on the plead-
ings was affirmed.
In the negligence action of Barry v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,6 the
court admitted into evidence tests as to the average speed of cars driven
on a particular street. These tests were taken around Christmas time. The
court was asked to judicially notice that the traffic around Christmas
time is heavier than at other times; and, therefore, the average speed was
less than the average speed at other times of the year. The court would
not take judicial notice of the above facts; and, since they were not
proved up, they were not in the record.
The second district court in Brown v. Ellingson77 would not judi-
cially notice the number of property owners in question. Therefore, the
necessary requirements of a proper class action were neither pleaded nor
proved, to wit: that the class of plaintiffs is too numerous to all be joined
in the suit.
VIII. ACCIDENT REPORTS
Under Florida Statutes section 317.171, no accident report or
contents thereof made for the purpose of complying with chapter 317 of
70. See, e.g., Bogan v. State, 211 So.2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
71. Staplin v. Canal Auth., 208 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
72. Rion v. Purdy, 212 So.2d 304 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
73. Bogan v. State, 211 So.2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
74. Wilkens v. Tebbetts, 216 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
75. Id.
76. 216 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
77. 224 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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the Florida Statutes7" can be used as evidence in a civil or criminal trial
arising out of the accident. To invoke the statutory exclusion privilege, it
must be clearly shown that the evidence sought to be excluded was directly
or indirectly utilized in the accident report.79
In Timmons v. State,8 ° the defendant was convicted of manslaughter
for operating his vehicle while intoxicated. Officers investigating the
accident called another officer to go to the hospital and obtain a blood test
from the defendant. The court held that the officer obtaining the blood
test was not part of the accident investigation process, and the blood test
was not privileged and was admissible.8
The court of appeal in Coffey v. State"2 determined that although the
defendant was informed that the investigatory process of the accident
was completed and that the balance of the investigation would become
criminal,"3 the blood test taken as part of the criminal investigation (con-
sented to by defendant) and made part of the accident report came within
the accident-report privilege. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed,
holding that when the investigating officer has completed the accident
investigation whereby any information included in the report up to that
point would be entitled to the accident-report privilege, he may then
"change his hat" and assume the duty of an officer charged with investi-
gating a crime."' In the instant case the defendant was apprised of his
constitutional rights and told that the blood test could be used against
him in the manslaughter case, therefore, such tests were admissible into
evidence. As long as it is clear to the defendant that the accident-report
phase of the investigation had ended and the criminal investigation had
begun, blood tests taken as part of the criminal investigation were ad-
missible.
IX. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
A. Generally
Under the Dead Man's Statute85 a party or person interested in the
suit cannot testify as to any transaction or communication between such
person and a deceased party when such testimony is sought to be used
in a suit involving the administrator, executor, or other personal repre-
sentative.
In a suit to quiet title, an executrix of a will was named as a party
78. Chapter 317 pertains to regulation of traffic on the highways.
79. Cannon v. Giddens, 210 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1968).
80. 214 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
81. Accord, Ashmore v. State, 214 So.2d 67 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
82. 205 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967), rev'd and rem'd, 212 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1968).
83. After investigating the accident the officer was advised that the driver whom de-
fendant hit was dead, and he thereupon advised defendant that the investigation woulc
continue as one for manslaughter.
84. State v. Coffey, 212 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1968), rev'g, 205 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967)
85. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1967).
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defendant. A deposition of the executrix was taken, reflecting testimony
as to conversations between the executrix and the decedent regarding the
establishment of a trust for the lands in question. The court held that the
above testimony was inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute although
the executrix had no interest in the outcome of the suit because she was
a party to the suit.8
6
The Dead Man's Statute applies where inter vivos transfers are
sought to be set aside because of undue influence asserted against the
decedent by the defendant. The defendant is not permitted to testify
as to the conditions concerning the transfer because the statute seeks
to prevent the surviving party from having the benefit of his own testi-
mony where the personal representative is deprived of the decedent's
version. 7
What falls within the purview of the Dead Man's Statute was the
subject of inquiry in Pitts v. Pitchford.88 The court held that testimony
regarding whether there was a seal on a note was not barred by the Dead
Man's Statute. The personal representative of the payee brought suit
against the maker of a note. If the note were under seal, the suit would
not be barred by the statute of limitations. The maker of the note testified
that the note was under seal when executed; and the plaintiff, the personal
representative of the decedent, objected to such testimony, contending
that it fell within the purview of the Dead Man's Statute. The court held
that the testimony was not barred by the statute. Testimony concerning
the signature of a party to a note is not subject to the statute because it
is not a transaction or communication, and testimony as to whether the
note was under seal is so closely related to the matter of the signature
that it is not barred either.
B. Waiver
If the defendant does not object to affidavits for a summary judg-
ment hearing containing statements by the plaintiff regarding com-
munications and transactions with the decedent, he has waived his right
to object to such testimony. Failure to object at the hearing removes the
protective cloak of the Dead Man's Statute and the defendant's waiver
continues throughout the proceeding. 9
X. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
Demonstrative evidence is generally admissible if it is relevant to
the issues, and if it is a reasonably exact replica of the object in issue. 90
86. Barber v. Adams, 208 So.2d 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
87. Howland v. Strahan, 219 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
88. 201 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
89. Boling v. Barnes, 216 So.2d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
90. Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
In Wade v. State,01 the court allowed the introduction of a master brake
cylinder as evidence of the murder weapon because the brake cylinder
was an exact replica of the one used in committing the crime.
Although there was no testimony identifying the object with which
the defendant assaulted the victim, the court allowed a knife with a red
substance on it, found on the defendant, to be admitted into evidence.
The court stated it was admissible for whatever probative value it might
have had.92
Photos which are clearly inflammatory and prejudicial are generally
inadmissible if they are not demonstrably material, although relevant,
to the party's case.9" In Albritton v. State,94 the State introduced photo-
graphs (color and black and white) which were exceedingly gruesome and
inflammatory in a second degree murder case. The court held the photos
of the sixteen-month-old decedent were admissible because they were not
only relevant but demonstrably material. The State had to prove that the
bruises and burns on the decedent's body were so numerous and so aggra-
vated that they would have resulted from physical mistreatment. The
pictures provided visual evidence of the extent and severity of the child's
injuries, indicating strongly their cause and source.
XI. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Under a Florida statute,9 5 disputed writings can be compared with
any writing proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. In
Barron v. State,96 the prosecution in a forgery case submitted sample writ-
ings of the defendant into evidence to be used as standards of comparison
with the alleged forged writings. The defendant objected to the use of the
sample writings, contending that the genuineness of the sample writing
was not established. The court held that the genuineness of the writing
can be established by evidentiary proof and not merely by admission of
its genuineness by the parties and admitted the sample writings into
evidence.
If the alleged forged writing is merely a copy of the original forged
writing, the State must lay a predicate for using the copy rather than the
original, otherwise comparisons will not be allowed between the forged
copy and the standard (genuine writing) .97
Under a Florida statute,9" death certificates are prima facie evidence
of the facts recited therein. Courts have held that such prima facie ev-
idence can be overcome by competent evidence to the contrary. Where a
91. Id.
92. Studdard v. State, 214 So.2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
93. Albritton v. State, 221 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
94. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 92.38 (1967).
96. 207 So.2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
97. Wincor v. State, 212 So.2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
98. FLA. STAT. § 382.20 (1967).
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death certifiate recited 9:00 A.M., as the time of death of both of the
parties, a doctor's testimony that the wife survived the husband by fifteen
minutes was sufficient to overcome the prima facie evidence of the death
certificate. 99
XII. LEGISLATION
The 1967 legislature amended Florida Statutes section 92.05100 to
provide that all final judgments and decrees rendered and entered in courts
of record of the State of Florida shall be admissible as prima facie ev-
idence of the entry and validity of such judgments and decrees. A court
of record means any court other than a small claims court, justice of the
peace court, municipal court, or the metropolitan court of Dade County. 10 '
99. Rimmer v. Tesla, 201 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
100. FLA. LAWS 1967, ch. 67-362.
101. Prior to the amendment only judgments or decrees of circuit courts of the state
were admissible as prima facie evidence of the entry and validity of such judgments and
decrees. FLA. STAT. § 92.05 (1965).
